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INTRODUCTION 
 
Business Networks in China is a topic that attracts arguments both from historic and from 
contemporary point of view. This chapter will delve both into the past and the present of 
business network relationships in China. We aim to review some of the historical assumptions 
about the fundamental principles of collaborative business relationships in South-East Asia and 
particularly different types of Chinese business network relationships. We also aim to 
challenge and contrast these assumptions with some evidence of business networking under the 
‘open-door’ policy framework. 
A wide variety of family controlled business networks in Asia emerged over the history 
of the region. Most of them have been scrutinised as inefficient non-market institutions that 
have been involved in economic activities as a substitute to proper market interactions. The 
literature on Chinese family and community business networks is populated with uncritical use 
of journalistic assumptions regarding the business relationships between Chinese immigrants in 
foreign countries or business network ties in mainland China. Often it is not possible to 
determine the boundaries between historical accounts, myths and popular narratives, and some 
documented practices. The field has huge definitional gaps and a lack of clear theoretical 
framework. 
As a result, the concept of Chinese business partnerships has been applied to countries 
such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, where the family head 
remains a head only as long as the family is undivided, and partners outside the family are 
widely accepted (Numazaki, 2000). There is also an overarching assumption that Chinese 
business networks are very similar and closely related to other Asian business networks (such 
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as Japanese zaibatsu and keiretsu, the Korean chaebol), but very distinct from European and 
North-American collaborative business relationships. 
In-spite of the numerous attacks on business networks in Asia, their adaptability and 
comparative advantages stemming from robust family bonds and the accumulation of relational 
value have become more evident to analysts. As these networks are based on fundamentally 
different relationships and business practices, generalisations across different countries and 
different types of network formations is not a promising intellectual path. 
For example, the Japanese family business networks zaibatsu resembled a closed intra-
family corporation, where family investors could not take back their own investments, and 
some family businesses have remained undivided for more than 300 years. As an institution, 
according to Numazaki (2000), zaibatsu was controlled by a family council, and the change of 
the number of partners took place only through family adoption, by marriage, or by birth and 
death. On the contrary, Chinese business networks have always been portrait as community 
networks where multiple families coordinate their business and investment activities through 
informal associations and community relationships. The difference in inheritance law in Japan 
and China, is perhaps one of the most influential factors historically that has led to the 
consolidation of economic power in Japan, and its relative fragmentation in China. The 
comparison between Chinese family networks guanxi, with the Japanese networks keiretsu 
highlights also differences such as government support and centralised leadership in Japan, 
openness, partnership and mutual benefits in China (Liben, 2000: 193,  Numazaki, 2000: 152, 
Todeva, 2006). The differences between Asian business networks become evident only after a 
closer look at their context and operations.  
Chinese business networks also show significant variations and the literature has 
developed three main streams of argumentation related to different regional phenomena – 
business networks formed by overseas Chinese immigrants; business networks in the mainland 
China, and Chinese business networks across the region that connect overseas with mainland 
Chinese communities. Different practices of collaboration and mutual support (favouritism) 
exist amongst these networks and a more precise analysis of these practices is essential to our 
understanding of business practices in the region. This paper aims to review some of the 
historical accounts of Chinese business collaborations and networking and to investigate how 
these practices have transcended from the past to the present Chinese business culture. The 
chapter draws on some research evidence of contemporary inter-firm relationships in the 
private sector in mainland China.  
The empirical results reported in this chapter are a result of a survey which was 
designed and administered from The University of Surrey, and the results were produced by an 
international team comprising of Dr. Emanuela Todeva, The University of Surrey, Tao Meng, 
Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFE), China, Donka Keskinova, Plovdiv 
University, Bulgaria. 
 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF CHINESE BUSINESS NETWORKS  
 
Each of the three types of Chinese business networks has different history and legacies. The 
history of the overseas Chinese business networks has been more documented and has 
generated more references in the literature. The literature acknowledges some form of Chinese 
business networks since the 12th century when the Chinese immigration and migration to other 
nations started. The reliance on personal trust in cash-handling is traced back in the literature to 
the Song Dynasty (1254-1323) with its decline in the management of currency, when money 
became vulnerable to forgery, depreciation, and loss of function (Bun, 2000). 
In the context of the development of the region at that time, the Chinese immigrants 
represented the most advanced group, bringing initially advanced commodity relationships, 
and later on high technical skills of mining and trading. These socio-economic developments 
were brought to different populations in the region subjected to fragmented political power and 
an absolute subordination to traditional authority (Gribb, 2000). In the context of these 
underdeveloped societies in the region and the lack of institutional environment, the Chinese 
community initiatives of these early years of migration had all the necessary conditions to 
flourish. During the early period of European colonisation of South-East Asia after 1511, the 
Chinese landlords controlled vast areas of the sugar industry in Malaisia, including estates and 
mills, keeping a mixed Malay and Chinese workforce. This fact by itself indicates that during 
the 16
th
 century there was a deeper social and economic integration between the Malay and the 
overseas Chinese communities.  
The most dominant power in the region in the 17
th
 century was the Dutch East Indies 
Company (VOC), whose policy had been to leave the people as much as possible under the 
control of their own rulers. At this time the Chinese communities were used to separate the 
Islamic population from the Christians, and particularly to tamper the religious antagonism. At 
that time the Chinese immigrant communities of traders and miners have had established quasi-
autonomous republics under the local rulers in Western Borneo and Malaysia. These 
community associations have been dominated by ‘patron-seeking’ relational practices that have 
been tapping into communal resources. These communities were known also as Chinese 
‘revenue farms’ in the 17
th
 to 19
th
 century as they were used by the Dutch East Indies Company 
as fiscal institutions encouraged for tax purposes to act as a source of revenue (Gribb, 2000: 
176).  
The severe downturn in the world sugar market in the 1720s, has stired a range of new 
developments in the Asia-Pacific region, which affected the behaviour and the myth of the 
Chinese business networks. The appearance of gangs of Chinese bandits, and the subsequent 
company policy of VOC to limit the Chinese immigration instigated much corruption of the 
regional administration of that policy, and was followed by a Chinese revolt and the 
subsequent massacre of Chinese by the Dutch authorities (Gribb, 2000). These historical events 
of the 18
th
 century demonstrate the creation of a number of myths about business network of 
Chinese immigrants, including the strength of their ethnic communities, their corrupt business 
practices and crony relationships with the indigenous rulers and with the power holders.  
A different myth about the Chinese business networks in the 18
th
 century is related to 
the commercial complexity of the gold mining industry, developed in the region and the 
leading role played by the Chinese immigrant networks. The Chinese entrepreneurs have often 
being accused of using corrupt practices in their efforts to collaborate and to adapt to various 
shifts in power in different host countries.  
Overall the myths of the Chinese business networks that have affected political 
judgements and scientific research have assumed similarities between various communal and 
business practices and trading activities from the colonial period (16
th
 - 19
th
 century) to the 
present. Comparing different historical accounts has confirmed that assimilating all 
relationships and communal organisations with Chinese involvement in the regions under the 
category of Chinese Business Networks produces numerous misleading assumptions and does 
not produce conceptual clarity. The next part of this chapter aims to highlight the variety of 
collaborative business relationships in mainland China and overseas. 
 
Variety of Chinese Business Network Practices - Guanxi, Hegu, Hui, Bangs, Clans  
 
In order to identify some of the fundamental principles that apply to Chinese business 
networks, we need first of all to look at what have been the practices in mainland China and 
what has been the institutional environment that has nurtured these practices. Some of the 
historical accounts refer to the traditional nepotism of the Chinese emperors, the corruption and 
particularism of the Chinese dynastic bureaucracy through the centuries, the lack of 
institutional support and government legal protection for business transactions and private 
property, the lack of sound legal system, or the distrust in it (Schak, 2000). In this context, the 
Chinese networks known as guanxi, appear to be established to facilitate exchange of personal 
and knowledge based resources, for mutual aid and for protection. The need to deal with 
institutional insecurity has stimulated the evolution of an alternative form of social 
organisation that provides with this security – or business networks. 
Guanxi means relationships that bind people through the exchange of favours. It also 
refers to reliance on informal business agreements. While some authors attempt to link the 
strength of the Chinese business networks to some fundamental religious attitudes, others argue 
that the normative basis of guanxi – as the development of particularistic and individualised 
relations with instrumental value does not come from Confucianism. The values of 
interpersonal trust and affinal reciprocity are universal, and many other people and nations 
have recognised the practical advantage of reciprocal obligations, against fears of reprisal and 
of losing functional ties. In addition to that, the merchant class in China itself has adopted 
Confucian rhetoric only as part of its flexible adaptation and search for legitimacy (Li, 2000). 
Guanxi networks are based on reciprocity of favours which facilitates social exchanges 
supported by a mutual belief in reciprocity. Guanxi resemble a set of affective ties between 
people, linked through kinship, native place, dialect, school, work-mate, or sworn brotherhood. 
Guanxi are established to facilitate exchange of personal and knowledge based resources, for 
mutual benefits and for protection (Bun, 2000). A main distinction of Guanxi networks is their 
ability to grow beyond the family, and to expand into economic activities within the wider 
community (Fig. 1).  
The Chinese family and community business networks although known as guanxi 
networks in the literature, encompass a number of other social practices. One of the early types 
of highly sophisticated business network institutions that has emerged in China and their 
activities were recorded by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), were hegu - based on investment 
contracts, shareholders, and the use of a general manager (Numazaki, 2000). These were inter-
family partnerships established between rich families as a joint venture for investing their 
family wealth and for making more money. Selected family members, entrusted by each family 
to act as representatives, could sign agreements as shareholders in the hegu. They bring the 
family capital to the hegu partnership and participate in strategic investment decisions for the 
appropriation of the collective pool of money. Hegu network is a proto-type of the modern 
investment funds with appointed fund managers. 
Another type of network formation in China described in the literature is the voluntary 
financial associations hui (Wu-Beyen, 2000: 129). This type of networks has been recorded 
both in China and in Taiwan and can be traced back to the Buddhist temple practices from the 
7
th
 century onwards that provided loan money to the poor. As an institution hui represents a 
charity or a cooperative social organisation that facilitates the establishment of a pool of money 
for communal borrowing with no interest, and brings mutual benefits to its participants. The 
practice of hui is that an initiator establishes a committee, and defines the rules of participation. 
The purpose is to establish a rotating savings and credit association. In this association all 
participants make financial contributions according to the rules. The collective pool of money 
goes to selected participants again according to the rules. The participation agreement is 
bonded by trust in the initiator and in the other participants. As a financial institution hui 
reduces the costs of financial capital, and extends the purchasing power of poor individuals and 
families, providing them with new social and economic opportunities. Hence the actors in this 
network are bounded simultaneously by economic interests and by trust. 
 
Fig. 1. Chinese Family and Community Business Networks – guanxi, hegu, hui, bangs, clans, 
kongsi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two other types of network formations with business purpose that have been recorded 
within the mainland China are the bangs (or network organisations based on linguistic 
similarities and a common dialect, with strong feudal patriarchal authority structure), and the 
clans (or family business networks based on extended family linkages, facilitating 
entrepreneurial access to resources such as labour, capital, information, credit, and markets). 
Family business networks of the type of clans enable individual members to utilise the benefits 
of family trust and family welfare. Network formations of the type of bangs also utilise the 
social resource of trust but trust is accumulated through business dealings, rather then through 
family bonds and derives from interpersonal relationships. 
Clans are primarily based on paternalistic relationships with full confidence in the 
family head who owns and manages all the businesses under the clan. The business leader 
family member
family representative
community institution
•homogeneous actors
•institution-centred network with permeable 
boundaries
•legitimacy-based governance 
•normative interdependence between actors
usually exhibits modesty, unrivalled experience, and moral authority. Strategic business 
decisions are made on the basis of experience, intuition, and informal exchanges of 
information, rather than detailed reports, or expensive advice by external consultants. Modesty 
in consumption, high rates of savings, and community financing is accounted as the main 
source of capital that finance the business activities of the clan (Weidenbaum, 1996). 
There is a tendency of bangs and clans to engage in as many business relationships as 
they can with people of similar culture - those from the same clan or village, or those who 
speak the same dialect. The growth of these business networks is based not on economic 
efficiency, but on strong preference for cultural proximity, risk sharing, and optimising of 
business returns.  
All these types of business networks within Chinese communities are represented in 
Fig.1, where family relationships transcend into community interactions. The essential 
characteristic of these networks s that families entrust family representatives, who at 
community level form a more permanent institution that absorbs decision-making power. In 
general, there is cultural homogeneity within these networks, the membership boundaries are 
permeable, and the entire network configuration exhibits legitimacy-based governance through 
legitimate representatives. There is no formal division of labour and different individuals are 
collectively entrusted to engage in different operations. The network develops its own rules and 
norms which generates normative interdependence. These networks nurture institutional 
authority which is established with rules and traditional practices that coordinate the collective 
efforts of the network members (Todeva, 2006).  
There are some efforts in the literature to transpose the principles of reciprocity in 
favours to contemporary Chinese business networks. Li Cheng (2000: 86) puts an emphasis on 
the technocrats and the entrepreneurs in the mainland China, without an attempt to explain the 
institutional background of these two elite groups. The author defines the technocrats as 
individuals with specialised training, who hold professional occupations and have a leadership 
position with political influence. The entrepreneurs are defined as business people who assume 
the risks of bringing together the means of production – capital, labour and materials – and 
who receive rewards from the profit in market value of the product. Both groups form 
extensive relationship networks. Li Cheng describes the Chinese entrepreneurs as ‘peasants-
turned-industrialists’ (Cheng, 2000: 96), who in pursue of non-agricultural career, and of new 
market opportunities, utilise the availability of cheap labour in rural areas and as a result 
generate private wealth (Zhang, 1995). These self-employed industrial and commercial 
entrepreneurs, stemming from ‘jobless youths’ and ‘landless peasants’ (Cheng, 2000: 99) are 
interlinked with all lairs of the technocrats, generating much of the corruption among officials. 
In spite of the educational credentials and the technical expertise of the technocrats, the upward 
mobility of the entrepreneurs is seen as the dominant force in the societal transformation of 
modern China. This is another example of articulation of myths based on accidental 
observations underpinned by an attitude to discredit the achievements of genuine entrepreneurs 
that take risks and operate in the buffer zone between the formal economy and the abundance 
of labour.  
 
Kongsi and the Chinese Overseas Business Networks 
 
The Chinese business networks claim also their popularity from the overseas Chinese 
communities, including different communal and business practices in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region. Such historical examples of Chinese community business networks discussed in the 
literature are: the trading activities during the colonial period of the 16
th
 - 19
th
 century; the 
quasi-autonomous communities in the Malay world in the 18
th
 century; the smuggling activities 
of Chinese entrepreneurs during the Opium War with France and Britain (1839-1842); and 
much of the entrepreneurial activities of the 20
th
 century (Bun, 2000). The family enterprise 
nested in a wider set of community relationships is the basic economic unit in these business 
practices. Numerous historical accounts clearly demonstrate the wide variety of ties among 
these overseas Chinese businesses, as well as their relationships with the indigenous local 
communities and ruling elites in the region. 
The Chinese revenue farms recorded by the Dutch East Indies Company were called 
kongsi, or Chinese communal business organisations. Kongsi maintained their own armed 
forces, health and education systems, and currencies. They developed essentially in the 18
th
 
century in the gold mining industry, where the Chinese immigrants possessed superior 
extractive technology. The subsequent campaigns of the colonial forces in 1850-54 to defeat 
these semi-autonomous communities articulated a number of myths of strong Chinese business 
networks who have the capacity to adapt and to make their way through various types of 
relationships that penetrate through legal boundaries. These myths have reaffirmed the 
complex image of Chinese business networks. 
Particularly interesting are the cases of Chinese business relationships in the Philippines 
(Shaolian, 2000: 224), in Singapore (Bun & Kiong, 2000: 71), and in Taiwan (Schak, 2000: 
112). Shaolian discribes the natives in the Philippines at the turn of the last century as living 
largely in a subsistence economy, while the poor at that time Chinese immigrants have brought 
with them commodity relationships established in a traditional market system. The 
advancement of the Chinese traders after they settled in the Philippines therefore, is not 
surprising. In recent history the post-war Philipinisation campaign in the 1950s and the 
liberalized investment laws in the 1970s have led to changes in the economic position of the 
Chinese immigrants and has put a substantial constraint on their status. In spite of the presence 
of Chinese businesses in all sectors of the economy including manufacturing and finance, their 
strength, according to Shaolian (2000), is still in the commercial sector. The author brings 
evidence of the integration of the Chinese businesses into the Philippine economy and society, 
including close links of their manufacturing production (such as textiles and leather) with the 
local market, and employment of predominantly Philipino professionals as high and middle 
ranking managers in Chinese owned businesses. 
The cases of mutually lucrative ties between Chinese businesses and Malay politicians 
presented by Gomez (2000) include co-optation of civil servants and politicians through 
interlocking directorship, expansion of patronage networks in order to secure state contracts 
and to access the distribution of state rents, and negotiated acquisition deals in order to 
consolidate financial power, or market presence. The author explains these cases with the 
systematic discrimination and distrust of Chinese immigrants which had constrained them from 
exploring a number of professions, and have forced them to move to commerce and trade with 
the need to cultivate government connections and mutual benefit ties (Gomez, 2000). Li also 
suggests that the Chinese minorities in the region have faced racial discrimination, which has 
left them being peripheral to the legal system and other social institutions, and has forced them 
to mobilise social, cultural, and financial capital within their own communities acting as a 
safeguard and protection for their interests (Li, 2000). Their businesses usually perform 
subassembly work, and make components that supply to others. They are also heavily involved 
in shipping, transporting, wholesaling, financing, sourcing, and more recently providing other 
services, such as real estate, hotels, and entertainment. Most of their operations are behind the 
scenes, minimizing the need for a public appearance and very often in the grey economy 
(Weidenbaum, 1996). 
A number of authors emphasise also that overseas Chinese networks are triggered by 
hostility, racial scape-goating, lack of institutional safeguards, and distrust (Bun, 2000, Holbig, 
2000). Their interpersonal relationships have evolved in a variety of institutional forms, 
facilitating social exchange based on a mutual belief in reciprocity and facilitating financial 
transactions.  
One of the controversial explorations of Chinese business networks most recently has 
been related to business practices in Taiwan. The change in the business environment in 
Taiwan after the Second World War has provided incentives and access to financial resources 
mainly for large enterprises. This, according to Schak (2000), has enforced the need for social 
and economic help and assistance for small businesses, which they sought to satisfy through 
informal networks. The trust relationships, established among small businesses, were important 
for raising capital, for obtaining technical advice, for subcontracting orders, and as alternative 
access to raw materials, or shared use of emergency equipment. It is clear from Schak’s 
analysis, that the level of co-operation between small businesses in Taiwan is very similar to 
the utilitarian by nature Western small business networks, established to share information, 
contacts and resources. The main differences appear to be the strong emphasis on establishing 
social relationships and more personal and affectionate ties among the Chinese businessmen. 
The driver behind network formation, according to Schak, is the division of labour between the 
large firms and the satellites, and the extensive subcontracting system, evolved around the 
efforts to incorporate former employees as business partners. Schak (2000) describes how large 
corporations extend their control over labour through assisting certain employees to establish 
their own factory, and then subcontracting to them – a mechanism also described in the context 
of western economies as spin-offs or externalising costs via outsourcing and extending control 
over suppliers and subcontractors, or acquiring access to intangible assets. 
Schak (2000) also makes the extremely valuable comment that the strong export-
oriented industrial growth in Taiwan in the 1980s, and the associated with it rising wages, 
scarcity of workers, government assistance to labour intensive industries to upgrade technology 
levels, the appreciation of the local currency, and the strictly enforced environmental protection 
law, have lead to relocation of manufacturing facilities and other businesses to China. His 
analysis does not reject the fact that until the 1970s personalised business deals were 
predominant, compared with business contracts. However, the spread of Chinese capital from 
Taiwan to main-land China is more due to regional economic and political factors, rather then 
to an expansion of Chinese business networks. The setting up of offices in China and Hong 
Kong in the 1980s is explained by the author with the insistence by the Taiwanese government 
on formal contracts for tax purposes, and by the need of Taiwanese firms operating in mainland 
China to handle foreign exchange, to coordinate shipping, and to deal with higher level of 
organisational complexity while reducing dependency on outsider trading companies. The 
growth of the recent Chinese / Taiwanese business networks is associated with the general 
conditions of economic growth in the region, the liberalisation of the economic environment in 
China, and the language and cultural affinity between the two countries. 
An attempt is made by Li (2000) to analyse the overall economic impact of Chinese 
capital within the region. The relocation of manufacturing firms from Hong Kong to mainland 
Chinese provinces attracted by low land and labour costs and the open-door policy of China 
explains strong trends of regional trade and foreign investment. Here we see also an example of 
the move of global capital through Hong Kong to China, where Chinese entrepreneurs and 
capitalists from the region are the main facilitators in this process.  
 
FUNDAMENTAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OF CHINESE BUSINESS NETWORKS 
IN THE LITERATURE 
 
There are at least five key stereotypic generalisations and misrepresentations used in the 
literature regarding Chinese business networks (Bun, 2000: 285). First, this is the assumption 
that the Chinese immigrants in the region are a homogeneous group. Such an assumption does 
not take into account any regional or social variations amongst the immigrants that have left 
mainland China to seek prosperity and wellbeing abroad. It also does not distinguish between 
the status of the Chinese in China and in foreign countries, and how it affects business 
operations. 
Second, the stereotype of Chinese business entrepreneurs abroad assumes that their 
trading and investment relationships as overseas immigrants resemble coherent social and 
business practices. Although the interdependency and self-reliance of communities of 
immigrants produce social network type of response to difficult situations, such a broad 
generalisation does not take into account the historical, political and economic context in which 
such communities operate.  
The Third assumption is that there is a consistency between the business practices of 
the Chinese Diaspora from the period of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when their dispersion 
as merchants started, and throughout the entire history after. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911) the immigration was led by labourers and workers and the most recent immigration 
wave after the Second World War was led by commercial entrepreneurs embedded in all 
sectors of the economy of mainland China.  
The fourth assumption is about the impact that the business activities of Chinese 
immigrants in the region have made on the national economies particularly in the 20
th
 century. 
In fact, the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines show the variety in 
occupational presence and relationships with the local power elites.  
The fifth assumption is related to the impact of Confucian cultural values on business 
relationships within Chinese overseas communities. Among the key cultural attitudes 
associated with Confucian ethics are: communitarianism, the emphasis on familism and 
obligation, paternalism, loyalty and commitment, frugality, diligence and pragmatism. This 
superficial treatment of culture is criticised by a number of authors. Peter Li (2000) explains 
that Confucian values in fact were not particularly sympathetic to merchant activities, and the 
merchant class itself has adopted Confucian rhetoric only as part of its flexible adaptation and 
search for an effective way of doing business in Southeast Asia. He also argues that the 
normative basis of guanxi as the development of particularistic relations with instrumental 
value does not come from Confucianism. The values of interpersonal trust and affinal 
reciprocity are universal, and many other people and nations have recognised the practical 
advantage of reciprocal obligations, against fears of reprisal and of losing functional ties. 
Such an account of Confucian values in the literature is not sufficient to position 
correctly the cultural heritage factor, and to incorporate the role of institutions, political power, 
and economic interests, as driving forces for the emergence and evolution of Chinese business 
networks – an intellectual project still in its making. Our contribution to these efforts is that we 
attempted to investigate empirically what business relationships emerge within dynamic 
Chinese communities where rapid economic growth creates multiple business opportunities for 
small firms to link to each other.  
Overall the historical accounts and myths of Chinese business networks have brought a 
large set of assumptions that continue to dominate the literature. As part of our long-term 
interest in business networks and their Chinese variant, and our strong interest in business 
network relationships within regional and industrial clusters we undertook an empirical 
investigation that aimed to illuminate more contemporary features of business networking in 
China and to test some of the existing assumptions. The empirical investigation was 
coordinated by an international team at the University of Surrey in the UK and was conducted 
in Liushi Town, Wengzhou City, Zhe Jiang Province in China, where we were able to observe 
the overlap between the rural and the industrialised China, and between the local economy and 
the Chinese export engine in the field of electrical appliance and component manufacturing. 
Overall the purpose of the empirical investigation was to test domineering assumptions 
in the literature outlined above such as that: Chinese business networks are embedded into 
family bonds and kinship ties; Chinese network members are connected by informal 
relationships; there is high interdependency within business networks; and finally that 
favouritism prevails over economic rationale. Our empirical findings examined each of these 
assumptions. 
The main research objectives for the survey were: a) to investigate the resource 
relationships between firms within the group, within the industry, and within the region; b) to 
analyse the motives for collaboration between firms; c) to explore the content of the inter-firm 
interactions and business relationships; d) to evaluate the impact of traditional relational drivers 
such family bonds, educational links and kinship relationships; e) to investigate the role of trust 
and friendship (personal ties) in inter-firm relationships. 
We conducted a survey with 41 firms that are associated with two large business groups 
operating in the same industry and in the same region. These were the Chint Group (22 firms) 
– which is number one by turnover for 2003, and the Tengen Group (19 firms), which is 
number three by turnover in the Liushi town list of business groups. Our representative 
samples for the two groups comprised of the headquarters, selected subsidiaries and 
subcontractors. Both surveyed groups are registered as shareholding companies, where the 
main shareholders come from one main family. However, at the level of subsidiaries we 
observe more distributed shareholding interests, and at the level of subcontractors, the 
shareholding link is very week.  
A questionnaire was administered with all respondent firms (in total 41 respondents 
including two headquarters, seven subsidiaries, and 32 subcontractors as formal members of 
the groups).  Information was collected from each respondent on their six most important 
relationships with suppliers, six most important relationships with clients and distributors, six 
most important relationships with banks and financial institutions, and two of the most 
important relationships with research institutes, government agencies and other public 
organisations (respectively for each type of institution). Some of the results from the empirical 
investigation are presented in Table 1 and are discussed in the context of the wider cluster 
developments in the Liushi town in Zhe Jiang Province. 
 
SOURCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF TRUST IN CHINESE BUSINESS NETWORKS – 
THE LIUSHI TOWN CLUSTER 
 
In our empirical investigation we explored the two fundamental concepts of business networks 
and clusters, and we aimed to investigate how business enterprises in a local proximity interact 
with each other, and how their business relationships transcend organisational and regional 
boundaries, and to what extend this is determined by past legacies (i.e. traditional and family 
bonds), or present and pragmatic economic realities.  
The example of Liushi town was chosen for three main reasons. Firstly, it represents a 
new administrative and organisational form, that has been introduced since 1981, called 
‘Chinese Township Enterprise’, located in the mainland China and outside of one of the free 
economic zones, hence representing the fringe between the rural and the industrial economy of 
mainland China.  
Second, Liushi town has earn the reputation of being the Chinese capital of electrical 
appliances industry, and without being on the formal political and administrative map of China 
it is the tenth richest city in the Zhe Jiang province. It is located in one of the fastest growing 
provinces in China – Zhe Jiang - ranked the fourth province in terms of GDP, and the first in 
terms of GDP per capita disposable income, as well as hosting the highest number of Top 500 
largest Chinese private companies (for 2004).  
Third, Liuishi town is in a close proximity to one of the first free economic zones 
established in 1992 in the Yueqing city - Yueqing Economic Development Zone. The 
authorities in Yueching have established 57 industrial sub-zones in close proximity and have 
stirred the development of 15 industrial satellites, among which is Liushi town. Both Yueqing 
city and Liushi town are located within the jurisdiction of Wenzhou city, managing the 
‘Wenzhou Economic & Technological Development Zone’ since 1992. Hence Liushi town 
represents the spill-over effect from the Chinese open-door policies, and this is where we 
would expect that Chinese business networks will be most active. 
Before we show some of the results from our investigation of the business networks 
relationships in Liushi town, we need to introduce the environmental context that has nurtured 
these relationships. Liushi town represents one of the Chinese township enterprises (CTE) that 
have developed rapidly since 1981. These CTEs are very similar to the revenue farms 
described during the 17
th
-19
th
 century in the South-east Asia. The CTEs are established as self-
sustained and self-financing enterprise systems, run by individuals that act as industrialisation 
mechanism in rural areas. They have employed labour from rural areas and by the mid 90s 
have accounted for 47% of the entire Chinese industrial output and one third of the exports 
(China Township Enterprises Daily, Sept. 29, 1995, 30: 1). Naturally these CTEs comprise of 
hundreds of small firms that produce similar products and learn from each other, and hence the 
association with the cluster concept as geographic agglomeration of interconnected firms. Li 
(1997) reports that by 1995 there have been over 1400 township enterprises in Liushi town 
itself famous for their competitiveness – all producing low-voltage switch gears and breakers. 
Now, these businesses produce over 5000 different products in the field of low and high-
voltage electrical apparatus, power transmission and distribution equipment, measuring 
instruments and electrical products for construction – some of which products represent 60% of 
the total Chinese output for 2004. This output comes from over 3000 registered firms and 34 
registered business groups in this micro-region.  
Another factor driving the developments in Liushi town is the introduction of a new 
form of ownership which was piloted at a wider regional level of the Wenzhou Economic 
Development Zone since 1992. This is the ‘joint stock cooperative’ – a mixture of employee-
management and cooperative ownership – well suited in the context of the CTE administration.  
In this context we focused on the top business groups that have emerged out of this rich 
small business environment. For our empirical investigation we selected the top Chint Electric 
Group and the third - Tengen Electric Group. Five of the six approved Chinese trademarks in 
low-voltage electric appliances come from the Liushi town and both of our selected groups 
have been awarded their own trademarks. Both groups have evolved in the context of demand 
driven low quality production of fake products, where only 1% of the output in 1990 was 
licensed. During the massive government-led ‘cleaning’ of the region from unlicensed 
manufacturing in the 1990s only 24 firms were awarded licences and they evolved into some of 
the current groups – pooling out resources from the rest of the unlicensed and bankrupt small 
businesses. This is an example where the licensed private firms have undertaken partially 
government functions to monitor quality and licensing.  
This rich institutional embeddedness of the groups was another factor that suggested an 
expectation for a lot of non-market ties. The inter-firm relationships in the Liushi town were 
expected to represent the metamorphoses of the modern Chinese business networks formed 
around nepotistic ties and dominated by informal business relationships. The results in Table 1 
are very indicative in this respect that the transformation of the practice of business networking 
in modern China requires a revision of our traditional concept for Chinese business networks. 
 
Table 1. Overview of survey results 
 Question Leading response 
1 Distance of suppliers 86 % - from the same city 
2 Distance of clients 62 % - outside of the province 
3 Distance of banks 100 % - from the same city 
4 Distance of research institutions 89 % - from the same city 
5 Distance of government organisations 100 % - from the same city 
6 Distance of other public organisations 100 % - from the same city 
7 Importance of suppliers 78 % - important 
8 Importance of clients 81 % - important 
9 Importance of banks 85 % - important 
10 Importance of research institutions 97 % - important 
11 Importance of government organisations 90 % - important 
12 Importance of other public organisations 71 % - important 
13 Dependence on the top 6 suppliers 55 % - moderately dependent 
14 Dependence on the top 6 clients 72 % - moderately dependent 
15 Dependence on the top 6 banks 75 % - moderately dependent 
16 Dependence on the top 2 research institutes 86 % - moderately dependent 
17 Dependence on the top 2 government 
organisations 
80 % - moderately dependent 
18 Dependence on the top other public 
organisations 
61 % - moderately dependent 
19 Shared knowledge with suppliers 37 % 
20 Shared knowledge with clients 49 % 
21 Shared knowledge with banks 49 % 
22 Shared technology with suppliers 66 % 
23 Shared technology with clients 24 % 
24 Shared management with suppliers 47 % 
25 Shared management with clients 59 % 
26 Acquired knowledge & technology from 
research institutes 
92 % 
 
27 Acquired knowledge & technology from 
government organisations 
56 % 
 
28 Acquired knowledge & technology from 
other public organisations 
78 % 
 
29 Acquired consulting services from research 
institutes 
87 % 
30 Acquired consulting services from 
government organisation 
81 % 
31 Acquired consulting services from other 
public organisations 
87 % 
32 Shared trust with suppliers 65 % 
33 How much do you trust suppliers 91 % 
34 How well do you know your suppliers 53 % - very well 
35 Shared trust with clients 69 % 
36 How much do you trust clients 90 % 
37 How well do you know your clients   62  % - very well 
38 Shared trust with banks 97 % 
39 How much do you trust banks 99 % 
40 How well do you know your banks   67 % - very well 
41 Shared trust with research institutes 82 % 
42 How much do you trust the research 
institutes 
91 % 
43 How well do you know the research institute   63  % - very well 
44 Shared trust with government agencies 89 % 
45 How much do you trust the government 
agencies 
100 % 
46 How well do you know the government 
agencies 
  18 % - very well 
47 Shared trust with other public organisations 96 % 
48 How much do you trust the other public 
organisations 
100 % 
49 How well do you know the other public 
organisations 
  26 % - very well 
50 Shared friendship with suppliers 54 %  
(Only 5% share family ties, 5 %-from the 
same school, and 3 % have common 
interests) 
51 Shared friendship with clients 63 % 
(Only 2 % share family ties, 8%-from the 
same school, and 4 % have common 
interests) 
52 Shared friendship with banks 62 % 
(Only 1 % share family ties, 6%-from the 
same school, and 22 % have common 
interests) 
53 Shared friendship with research institutes 63 % 
(Only 10 % have common interests) 
54 Shared friendship with government 
organisations 
24 % 
(Only 6%-from the same school, and 2 % 
have common interests) 
55 Shared friendship with other public 
organisations 
41 % 
56 Are your suppliers in the same group? 94% - no 
57 Are your clients in the same group? 66 % - no 
58 Are your suppliers in the same industry? 71% - yes 
59 Are your clients in the same industry? 76 % - yes 
60 Payments with suppliers 40 % - bank transactions 
20 % - cash transactions 
14 % - credit 
61 Payments with clients 66 % - bank transactions 
22 % - cash transactions 
2 % - credit 
 
The data from the survey clearly indicates that firms select all of their banks, government 
organisations and other public organisations from the same city (100%), and a very large 
proportion of their suppliers (86%). However, the business network is pragmatically opened 
outwards regarding clients and distributors (62% of clients are located outside the province). At 
the same time there is no significant difference in the importance of different types of business 
partners (variables 7-12), and a moderate dependence from them (variables 13-18). Most of the 
suppliers (94%) are not from the same group, which shows very low intra-group trading, and 
also the shared knowledge with suppliers is fairly low (37%), compared with banks and clients 
(49%). The sharing of technology is reverse – where sharing with suppliers is higher (66%) 
compared with the sharing of technology with clients (24%). 
The results show also a very strong institutional impact from research institutes - 92% 
of the firms acquire technology and knowledge and 87% acquire consulting services from local 
research institutes. The category of other public organisations also emerges strongly as a source 
of innovation - 78% of the firms acquire knowledge and technology and 87% acquire 
consulting services from other public non-governmental organisations. 
An interesting fact is that very high percentage of firms share management with 
suppliers (47%) and with clients (59%). This might be due to a specific ownership structure 
that has emerged as part of the institutionalisation of the joint stock firm, or with some other 
specific features to the transactions that take place within the business network.  
The results on trust are also very interesting. In general, firms trust all of their business 
partners (between 90% for clients and 99% for banks). At the same time, they indicate that this 
trust is a little bit less shared (between 65% for suppliers and 97% for banks). Firms also 
indicate that the trust is not strongly associated with knowing the partner (18% for government 
agencies and 67% for banks). The trust is not based also on common interests, family bond or 
being from the same school - very low for all partners. It is not correlated with business group 
membership either, as most suppliers and clients are not from the same group, while they are 
from the same industry - indicating a value-chain resource linkages. These results can be 
contrasted with the practices of payments and handling money - 40 % of the relationships with 
suppliers use bank payments, another 20 % handle transactions with cash payments and only 
14 % use credit. The figures for clients are – 66% bank transactions, 22% cash payments, and 
only 2% credit. Clearly firms prefer more formal and on-the-spot payment relationships, which 
would assume mistrust rather then trust. All these figures suggests that the high level of trust is 
more associated with the friendship (54% with suppliers and 63% with clients and research 
institutes), rather then with the money exchange, or any other stereotypical assumptions in the 
literature such as family bonds or common interests. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The empirical investigation which we undertook in the Zhe Jiang Province in China challenges 
a number of assumptions about Chinese business networks historically. The firms in our 
sample show very high level of trust to business network partners including government 
agencies. At the same time they show quite a significant distance from official government 
agencies. This challenges one of the main historical assumptions that a weak legal and 
institutional framework instigates bonding and networking. On the contrary, our empirical 
results reveal that strong legal and institutional framework can co-exist with business network 
relationships based on trust and friendship. The fact that high trust can co-exist with different 
levels of friendship (Table 1, variables 50-55) is very indicative in this respect and requires 
much further investigation. 
An interesting relationship is observed between high personal trust, and high use of 
banking institutions for monetary transactions. Holbig (2000) has argued that the institution of 
money as impersonal and generalised medium of communication allows system trust to be 
built in a society, replacing personal trust. Our survey shows that the two are complementary 
and can coexist rather then acting as a substitute to one another. It is true that trust employs 
cultural resources and reduces uncertainty of business transactions, as well as transaction and 
information costs. This however should not be attributed to being triggered by uncertainty, but 
rather to be a cultural attribute within the community of firms, or an intrinsic feature of the 
business networks in China. 
From the historical overview of the literature it is clear that there is no clear framework 
what set of social relationships are employed for business purposes and how these emerge as 
business practices which represent the collective efforts of interlinked individuals and families. 
None of the historical accounts makes a reference to the notion of friendship, which is a special 
encounter in our empirical research, and represents a fact that needs further investigation. 
Our empirical analysis of the contemporary Chinese business networks addresses some 
of these concerns in the literature regarding the causal relation between socio-economic 
conditions that lead to commercial success and the entrepreneurial qualities and relational 
values. All respondents in our survey showed a high level of pragmatism and openness to 
relationships that bring simultaneously monetary value and friendship. These are observed in a 
situation of local competition and local institutional support. Although family bonds still might 
be playing strong role at the level of network governance within the joint-stock companies and 
business groups, the dynamics of the business relationships is strongly driven by trust, 
friendship and institutional support from banks, government agencies, research and other 
organisations in the region. 
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